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A Tale of Two Paranoids: A Critical Analysis of the Use of the
Paranoid Style and Public Secrecy by Donald Trump and Viktor
Orbán
Abstract
Within the last decade, a rising tide of right-wing populism across the globe has inspired a
renewed push toward nationalism. Capitalizing on an increasingly chaotic public sphere,
leaders are stoking fear in their constituents such that their radical ideologies and hardline
policy decisions may be enacted. This article offers a comparative study of two leaders
exploiting the vulnerabilities of their respective citizenries: United States President Donald
Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán. Drawing from and reimagining
Richard Hofstadter’s germane essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics,” we argue
that both represent a new manifestation of the paranoid style as it enables (and is enabled
by) “public secrecy.” By controlling the media and redirecting collective attention by way of
rhetorical sleight of hand, the two are able to sow disorder and confusion such that their
secrecy may persist out in the open. Despite using similar issues to promulgate fear and
paranoia, most prominently the refugee and immigration crises, and their similar end
goals, the two must nonetheless engage in different discursive strategies that reflect the
distinct cultures and histories of their respective countries.
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Abstract
Within the last decade, a rising tide of right-wing populism across the globe
has inspired a renewed push toward nationalism. Capitalizing on an
increasingly chaotic public sphere, leaders are stoking fear in their
constituents such that their radical ideologies and hardline policy decisions
may be enacted. This article offers a comparative study of two leaders
exploiting the vulnerabilities of their respective citizenries: United States
President Donald Trump and Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán. Drawing
from and reimagining Richard Hofstadter’s germane essay, “The Paranoid
Style in American Politics,” we argue that both represent a new
manifestation of the paranoid style as it enables (and is enabled by) “public
secrecy.” By controlling the media and redirecting collective attention by way
of rhetorical sleight of hand, the two are able to sow disorder and confusion
such that their secrecy may persist out in the open. Despite using similar
issues to promulgate fear and paranoia, most prominently the refugee and
immigration crises, and their similar end goals, the two must nonetheless
engage in different discursive strategies that reflect the distinct cultures and
histories of their respective countries.
Keywords: Richard Hofstadter, Viktor Orbán, paranoid style, populism, public
secrecy, Donald Trump

In this article, we reimagine the role of the paranoid style by two world
leaders, President Donald Trump of the United States and Prime Minister of
Hungary, Viktor Orbán, in light of the cultural, political, economic, and
technological changes that significantly altered the geo-political situation. In
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particular, we examine Trump and Orban's rhetorical strategies as a
manifestation of “public secrecy,” which necessary to understand the current
shift towards populism in Western democracies. As civic institutions are
undermined, the public sphere is polarized, and collective memory
obfuscated, the paranoid leader is able to hide their true motivations by
relying upon the chaos they produce. Their success is due in large part to
the ability to distract and divert attention on non-issues, control and
manipulate the media, and provide false narratives via public gaslighting, all
of which are made exponentially more effective with the creation of a
nebulous, ill-defined enemy. Given the distinct cultures and histories of
Hungary and the U.S., respective paranoid leaders deploy these strategies
differently. We take a comparative approach in this article in order to
illustrate how neither Trump or Orbán’s rise to power is unique, but rather is
representative of a larger populist turn that utilizes tactics that embrace
public secrecy and threaten the legacy of Western liberal democracy.
The Paranoid Style and Public Secrecy
Since its publication in 1964, Richard Hofstadter’s germane essay, “The
Paranoid Style in American Politics,” continues to be popular in academic
scholarship, with a wide range of fields using his framework as a critical tool
to deconstruct everything from Ancient Greek paranoia (Sagan 1991), the
role of collective memory in South Africa (Fassin 2008) to grassroots calls to
amend tax law (Zelenak 2014). The paranoid style has transcended
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/3
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academic circles and is part of a broader lexicon, making fairly recent
appearances in popular media like The Atlantic (Douthat 2008), The
American Conservative (Jenkins 2013), The Economist (“The Paranoid Style
in American Politics” 2006), and the New York Times (Edsall 2016). Within
the rhetorical field, there is also a wealth of scholarship (Caliendo 1999;
Goldzwig 1991; Howell 2012; Lattin 2000; Nikolaev and Porpora 2006), yet
there is a failure to acknowledge the implications of technological advances
(particularly social media) and the unforeseeable national and global crises
that have greatly impacted the contemporary rhetorical situation. While the
major themes remain relevant, the cultural, political, and economic
landscape from which Hofstadter’s original argument emerged, as well as
subsequent scholarship, merits revisiting in light of the current
circumstances. The increased ubiquity of news media, especially the swift
rise of social media and the ability to personalize one’s news experience, the
shifts in educational priorities, and the rise of nationalism echo parts of
Hofstadter’s original position, but have come together to pose a problem
unique in the current state of affairs. One important element that we stress
in this article is the discursive connection between a paranoid leader and the
collective mindset they are cultivating through ideological manipulation.
According to Hofstadter (2008, 4), the paranoid style is the driving
force behind minority – sometimes fringe – leaders who adopt the view of
“the hostile and conspiratorial world…as directed against a nation, a culture,
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a way of life whose fate affects not himself alone but millions of others.”
Unlike psychotic paranoia as defined by a clinician, (often uncontrolled and
devoid of reason), the persecution expressed through the paranoid style
“begins with certain defensible judgments” (Hofstadter 2008, 36), which are
then extended to unreasonable demands by a “leap of imagination”
(Hofstadter 2008, 37). Consequently, “catastrophe or the fear of catastrophe
is most likely to elicit the syndrome of paranoid rhetoric” (Hofstadter 2008,
39, emphasis added). As a result, the paranoid rhetor is able to circumvent
the necessary warrants and support required in traditional argumentation so
as to arrive upon the extreme conclusion they desire.
U.S. history indicates a long-standing legacy of such rhetoric (and the
subsequent policy revisions) surrounding critical moments, particularly
during times of war. For example, consider the numerous times the United
States limited constitutional rights in response to perceived threats. The XYZ
Affair brought about the Alien and Sedition Acts of 1798. The Civil War led
President Lincoln to suspend habeas corpus. World War I inspired the
Espionage Act of 1917 and Sedition Act of 1918, which were legitimized in
the nation’s first Supreme Court decisions curbing the First Amendment.
President Franklin Roosevelt’s internment camps responded to the presumed
threat of Japanese-American citizens, again legitimized by the Supreme
Court in Korematsu v. United States. McCarthy’s red scare, Nixon subverting
his political opponents, and Bush’s “War on Terror” all illustrate the ease with
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which a democratic nation can slip into authoritarian policies for fear that
their way of life will be taken away, often at the behest of a leader stoking
paranoia.
The paranoid style is not absent in European politics, though the
theoretical lens has only recently been applied to understanding the political
situation in the European Union (EU). The paranoid style has gone global
partly due to the global economic crisis of 2008 and growing distrust in
governing institutions (Drezner 2010). This distrust, Drezner argues, played
out in many national elections, most notably the 2010 parliamentary election
in Hungary wherein the right-wing party, Fidesz, took the majority, and the
far right-wing anti-Semitic and anti-Gypsy minority opposition party, Jobbik,
finished third. Jobbik was able to successfully push the platform and the
rhetoric of the established conservative party, Fidesz, further to the right. By
appealing to Jobbik supporters, Fidesz gained the support of the public and
gained control of public opinion – a position they have securely maintained
to the present day. Under the leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán,
Fidesz has introduced a number of nationalistic and isolationist policies that
ostensibly serve to protect Hungary. Since 2010, numerous examples of the
paranoid style have become evident in Europe (the Austrian, Dutch, and
French elections, for example), but arguably Hungary was the first to employ
the paranoid style as it currently conceived.
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A common theme among invocations of the paranoid style is how the
paranoid sees “conspiracy as the motive force in historical events” and
“conspiracy in apocalyptic terms” (Hofstadter 2008, 29). Given the
perception of such high stakes, the paranoid possesses an unrelenting desire
for victory:
The paranoid is a militant leader. He does not see social conflict as
something to be mediated and compromised, in the manner of the
working politician. Since what is at stake is always a conflict between
absolute good and absolute evil, the quality needed is not willingness
to compromise but the will to fight things out to a finish. Nothing but
complete victory will do.” (Hofstadter 2008, 31, emphasis added)
Enemies cannot be reasoned with, argues the paranoid, therefore they must
be destroyed. Hofstadter (2008, 31-32) continues,
This enemy is clearly delineated: he is a perfect model of malice, a
kind of amoral superman: sinister, ubiquitous, powerful, cruel, sensual,
luxury-loving… He is a free, active demonic agent. He wills, indeed he
manufactures, the mechanism of history himself, or deflects the
normal course of history in an evil way.
Important to note, the enemy crafted through the paranoid style is not
simply targeting the paranoid leader, but also “the people” represented by
the leader. Yet, much like the vague and shadowy enemy looming in the
midst, “the people” is ill-defined for strategic reasons and allows the
paranoid rhetor the ability to call a particular “people” into being. Michael
Calvin McGee (2009, 344) argues that “the people” are created in a speech
act if individuals make the choice to agree with the speaker:
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When “one man stands up as the proclaimer of a general will,” what he
says, at the time he originally says it, is a fiction, for it is his personal
interpretation of his “people’s” history. Though he warrants his
argument with abundant examples, he creates, not a description of
reality, but rather a political myth.
These “myths” are at the heart of the paranoid style and serve to fuel
further paranoia. By outlining the myriad of dangers set against “the
people,” the right audience accepts the political myth and thus lives in “mass
illusion” (McGee 2009, 345). During times of crises “the people” are more
susceptible to paranoid appeals, which echoes David Hume’s claim that the
crux of persuasion is not logic, but rather an appeal to an emotionally guided
intuition (Hume 1983). As Hermann Goering so chillingly described, “Voice or
no voice, the people can always be brought to the bidding of the leaders.
That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and
denounce pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger.
It works the same way in any country” (Gilbert 1995, 278-79). Both Trump
and Orbán have been able to call a particular people into being by drawing
upon the paranoid style to stoke feelings of fear and disgust while
simultaneously undermining or outright ignoring contradictory arguments.
Much of the power of the paranoid style derives from fact that it is
hidden in plain sight. Little of what the paranoid leader does in calling upon
“a people” and crafting an enemy from which the people need to be kept
secure is kept secret. They do not appear to be working behind closed doors,
even if they are. Unlike earlier manifestations of the paranoid style, however,
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the institutions that citizens once relied upon to shed light upon the opaque
goings on in an administration have been significantly undermined. The
danger of the current situation is that secrecy is in the open because of the
proliferation and ubiquity of false narratives and “alternative facts.” The
confluence of media messages coming from multiple venues and speakers
allow for a kind of “public secrecy,” wherein attention economies have
become so saturated and capricious that false narratives, alternative facts,
and fake news obscure the reality and truth is increasingly more difficult to
discern. Even when well-meaning citizens, organizations, and news agencies
attempt to curb misinformation and report accurately, they are battling a
hydra; when one false story is destroyed, two take its place. False and
inaccurate information is easy to inject into public discourse, but much more
difficult and time consuming to legitimately disprove.
The idea of public secrecy is by no means new with numerous
disciplines addressing the idea in one way or another, including political
science (Robertson 1982), queer studies (Sedgewick 1991), sociology (Ku
1997), anthropology (Taussig 1999), women’s studies (Mookherjee 2006),
and legal studies (Young 2011) amongst others. The scholarship tends the
idea of public secrecy in one of two ways. The first is what Michael Taussig
(1999, 5) frames as “knowing what not to know.” Whether it is a small group
or an entire public, such an interpretation of public secrecy is tantamount to
being complicit in sustaining a state of appearances that does not reflect
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reality for the sake of maintaining order and/or power. Susan Maret (2011,
11) calls attention to the second prominent conception of public secrecy,
which stresses the immense challenge in knowing what is true and what is
false when the public is oversaturated with too much information. As a
result, the process of a public coming to a timely judgment on pertinent
issues becomes complicated if not outright impossible (Gladwell 2007).
Rather than focusing on one conception of public secrecy, we argue
that both contribute to and reinforce one another. Given the innumerable
sources of news media and the ease with which their information
(sometimes wholly illegitimate) may be spread via social media, the
problems associated with oversaturation are exponentially worse since
Gladwell documented them. The same can be said for Jack Bratich’s (2006)
analysis of public secrecy by way of spectacle in a post-9/11 U.S., which
highlights the threat of cataclysmic war with a vague, unconventional
enemy. Despite the harsh critiques of the Bush administration, current
politicos nonetheless underscore the various ways in which they subscribed
to traditional norms of governance. In the U.S. and across the Western world
these norms have been all but abandoned. Drawing attention to this
important issue, we argue that the tactics of public secrecy used by leaders
Trump and Orbán, particularly their ability to divert attention through control
of the media and rhetorical sleight of hand, serve as a contributing factor to
the often willful blindness that allows the paranoid to work with the
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appearance of transparency. Although the methods of obfuscation are
distinct from traditional modes of secrecy, the end result is nonetheless the
same. By drawing attention to this global issue, we hope to contribute to the
interdisciplinary study of secrecy and call attention to the subtle power of
public secrecy as an increasingly prominent authoritarian strategy.
Paranoid Styles in Hungary and the United States
As Hofstadter notes, the paranoid style has a long and sordid history.
There are many facets that make the contemporary moment different, but
for the purposes of our analysis, we will focus on two aspects of this era that
are relevant for our analysis of the paranoid style. First, the paranoid context
in which we now find ourselves comes after a period marked by a shift
toward liberalism. In 1989, following the end of Sovietism and the Cold War,
there was a global transition toward Western liberal democracy and market
economy. For Francis Fukuyama (1989, 3), this represented an “unabashed
victory of economic and political liberalism.” Fukuyama (1989, 4) argues
that, “What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the
passing of a particular period in post war history, but the end of history as
such: that is, the endpoint of mankind’s ideological evolution and the
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human
government.” Although not without his critics, Fukuyama was not alone in
his sentiment that liberal democracy had won. Economist Amartya Sen
(2001, 5) writes, “while democracy is not yet universally practiced, nor
https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/secrecyandsociety/vol1/iss2/3
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indeed universally accepted, in the general climate of world opinion,
democratic governance has now achieved the status of being taken to be
generally right.” Thus, 1989 is a watershed moment in history when
democratic governance became the right way to govern. As Fukuyama
notes, many (citizens and political leaders alike) approached the end of the
millennium with a sense of optimism that all opposition to liberalism would
be exhausted. Given this, the current turn toward paranoia, and its
associated nod to isolationism, xenophobia, and illiberalism, seems
unexpected.
A second unique characteristic of this contemporary moment is how
global it is in scale. Journalists and scholars alike have noted that
authoritarian populism is on the rise in many Western democracies. Populism
is meant to be a socio-political movement that represents the concerns of a
largely alienated and underrepresented majority. However, populism has
come to be code for far right-wing political movements. The right-wing party
that becomes the populist party uses the language of “the people” and
“democracy” in order to justify their almost unquestioned and
unquestionable power. Populist leaders use dissatisfaction with “politics as
usual,” economic insecurity, and xenophobia as pivotal issues on which to
base their claims that the popular opinion of the majority is that the country
is headed in the wrong direction. From this platform, then, the leader can
put forth actions that are justified given the desires of the people, even if
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they are uninformed (sometimes misinformed) about the potential
implications. Populism is now a driving political force in Europe and the
United States. The Brexit vote, the election of Trump, far right-wing
candidates in Austria, Italy, France, and The Netherlands, who have
experienced great support (even though they did not win their elections),
and the establishment of a strong right-wing government in Poland and a
movement towards one in the Czech Republic, all are indications of the
prominence of current populist movements. Hungary, however, was the first
in Europe, and therefore provides an important case study with Orbán “a
blueprint for a would-be strongman” (Frum 2017).
Due to its membership in the European Union, Hungary is by default a
democracy. In order to be considered for admission, prospective countries
must demonstrate an adherence to EU values such as freedom of speech,
religion, press, and movement. However, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has
unabashedly decried liberal democracy and instead favors an illiberal nation.
In a 2014 speech given in Băile Tuşnad, Romania, the Prime Minister
proclaimed, “[The] Hungarian nation is not a simple sum of individuals, but a
community that needs to be organized, strengthened and developed, and in
this sense, the new state that we are building is an illiberal state, a nonliberal state” (Orbán 2014, emphasis added).
In calling for illiberalism, Orbán recognizes that his policies are unaligned with democratic ideals, but makes the argument he is acting in
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accord with the Hungarian community. Thus, individual Hungarian citizens
and members of the broader European community may reject Hungarian
populist policies, but Orbán maintains that they are for the good of
Hungarian identity. In the same speech, Orbán (2014) explained, “systems
that are not Western, not liberal, not liberal democracies and perhaps not
even democracies, can nevertheless make their nations successful.”
In order to understand the origins of the current political climate in
Hungary, it is necessary to give some historical context. Hungary, like all of
Central and Eastern Europe, was under Soviet rule from the end of World
War II until 1989. Unlike other former Warsaw Pact countries, however, the
transition from communism to market economy to democracy was relatively
smooth. There was no demonstrable exchange of power. The Hungarian
Socialist Worker’s Party (MSzMP), the ruling party from 1956 to 1989
reformed themselves as the left-wing Hungarian Socialist Party (MSzP) in
1989 and continued to enjoy ruling power. Miklós Neméth, who was prime
minister during the transition was not ousted but rather simply changed
political affiliation from MSzMP to MSzP. With the exception of a brief period
from 1998-2002 when the right-wing party Fidesz held control of the
government under the Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (the same Orbán who
currently holds leadership), the liberals dominated leadership throughout the
Communist era and well into the 2000s.
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Hungary joined the EU with relative ease in 2004. At this time within
Europe, Hungary was doing well in terms of social and economic issues, but
among the populace there was a legitimate and growing distrust of the
government. Writing at the time, political scientist Eric Beckett Weaver
(2006, 157) predicted that “unless something changes radically in Hungarian
politics, voters seem likely to remain entrapped in a choice between a former
communist, corrupt socialist coalition, and a corrupt populist elite who insult
the electorate’s intelligence for some time to come.” Weaver’s prediction
came true in the same year that his article was written. In September of
2006, a recording featuring a long expletive-filled rant from then Prime
Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was leaked. In this rant, Gyurcsány used fairly
derogatory language to describe the country and his political party and even
admitted to lying to the public. This leaked speech became the spark that
ignited the powder keg of social, economic, and political tensions that had
been primed and ready to explode throughout Hungary. Protestors from all
over the country flooded into the capital city. The opposition parties, Fidesz
or Jobbik, capitalized upon the dissent of the protesters to move their
platform further to the radical right. Fidesz rhetorically aligned themselves
with the will of “the people,” the protestors. Thus, they were well positioned
to easily sweep the parliamentary elections in 2010. As a result, a populist
right-wing government under the leadership of Viktor Orbán emerged
victorious and positioned themselves as the people’s party.
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Like Hungary, the cultural shifts over the past few decades in the
United States have helped create an ideological landscape that has allowed
contemporary right-wing populism to flourish. Hofstadter was inspired to
write “The Paranoid Style” in large part because of Goldwater’s campaign
rhetoric. The paranoid style may have always been present to a certain
degree, ebbing and flowing in times of crisis such as the constitutional
restrictions noted earlier, but these are often considered shameful moments
in American history with some even garnering presidential and congressional
apologies. Nonetheless, one particular legacy of the Goldwater campaign has
grown in power and remains today: the Southern Strategy.
Responding to the Civil Rights Movement and a demographic shift in
party politics, the Southern Strategy characterizes the change from
“Dixiecrat” conservative southern democrats to the Republican party as it
exists in large part today. As African-American citizens left the South for
Northern metropolitan areas throughout the “great migration” (1915-1960),
Southern politics became increasingly tied to state’s rights, segregation,
evangelical religion, and conservative ideology. Barry Goldwater’s Republican
presidential campaign in 1964 and George Wallace’s independent campaign
in 1968, while unsuccessful in their short-term goal of winning the
presidency, proved pivotal as they capitalized on the shifting racial
demographics of the South and the growing tensions between the
Democratic and Republican parties regarding a range of social issues.

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

15

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 3

Acknowledging the changing tide, Nixon adopted many of the same positions
and tactics in order to entice Republican voters in the South, which
ultimately won him the presidency and reelection. Once a stronghold of
democratic politics, the South has been reliably Republican ever since and
dominated by a conservative, Christian worldview.
Exacerbating the ever-growing ideological divide catalyzed by the
Southern Strategy was the dismantling of the Fairness Doctrine.
Implemented in 1949, the Fairness Doctrine was a policy laid down by the
Federal Communications Commission that regulated broadcasters’ coverage
of controversial social, political, and economic issues. When addressing
matters of public importance, broadcasters were required to air competing
viewpoints fairly in order to provide citizens with a well-rounded perspective
necessary to render an adequately informed judgment. The policy was
repealed in 1987 on the grounds that it undermined the First Amendment
rights of broadcasters. Given the exponential rise in media sources, the
assumption was that the marketplace of ideas would provide enough
competition such that the broadcasters, taken as a whole, would cover the
issues without the need for governmental oversight (Ruane 2011). Removing
the regulation resulted in a deluge of ideologically driven news media. While
both liberals and conservatives have their broadcasting havens,
conservatives were much more adept at creating wildly popular national
programming. The advent of the Internet further magnified the ability of
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consumers to cater their news experiences so as to complement and
reinforce their ideological positions.
The terrorist attacks during and after 9/11 were decisive moments that
continue to shape the socio-political landscape and offered rhetors in the
U.S. and Europe a framework for defining internal and external threats.
Following 9/11, the United States significantly increased its security
infrastructure and ability to monitor communication at home and abroad.
Waging wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, in addition to the numerous other
military operations throughout the Middle East, Muslims became a primary
target of fear, disgust, and paranoia overnight, even if they were long
standing or natural born citizens. Since the terrorist cells were not affiliated
with any particular government, the “War on Terror” provided ample
resources to fuel the paranoid style as it undermined the traditional models
of conflict in favor of a faceless, decentralized enemy force. As a result,
xenophobia and isolationism became viable, if not necessary, positions for
many Westerners.
Additionally, the global economic crisis beginning in 2008 provided yet
another reason to be wary of an ill-defined “other.” The U.S housing market
alone is estimated to have lost over $19 trillion in the immediate aftermath
of the recession (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2012), yet untold trillions
will be lost in the long-term. Moreover, nearly nine million jobs were lost
throughout all corners of the U.S. workforce, many of whom also saw
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significant losses to their retirement plans. Although the employment rate
has returned to pre-recession numbers, wages have remained virtually
stagnant for most workers, further increasing income inequality. The impact
of the Great Recession is vast and will not be fully realized for years, if not
decades. The immediate impact, however, is obvious in the political rhetoric
deployed since, as politicians and pundits responded to the economic pinch
felt by so many Americans. For our present purposes, the economic crisis
continues to fuel populist appeals and serves as an economic threat that
compliments the militaristic and cultural threat posed by Muslims. Combined,
they set the stage for the internal and external threats utilized throughout
paranoid discourse.
Despite their distinct political, cultural, and economic histories,
Hungary and the United States share similar discursive themes as embodied
by their populist leaders. The countries portray themselves as transparent,
while portend conspiracy theories as a means to hide in plain sight. Indeed,
with social media and 24-hour news coverage, the public is more aware than
ever about what politicians appear to be doing, which becomes a
performative element of the paranoid style. With their unique histories in
mind, we argue that two prominent aspects of public secrecy-control of the
media and sleight of hand-are embedded in the discourses of their paranoid
leaders, yet manifest in discrete ways due to the different circumstances
that led to their respective surges in populism.
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Control of the Media
Perhaps the most ubiquitous and effective way in which Trump and
Orbán have been able to work in public secrecy is through the control of the
media. The two leaders (and their respective parties and administrations)
employ different strategies, but the end result is the same. The
manipulations of the leader are hidden behind a veil of media chaos. For
Trump, the media, unless favorable to him, is fake and conspiratorial. For
example, on May 28th he tweeted, “the Fake News Media works hard at
disparaging & demeaning my use of social media because they don't want
America to hear the real story!” (@realDonaldTrump, May, 28, 2017). The
media is the ideal scapegoat. Orbán has a far greater ability to construct and
control the Hungarian mediascape, and justifies his control of media outlets,
because unchecked they become enemies of the state.
Media in both the United States and Hungary are protected by the
freedom of press, but in Hungary, Orbán found many means through which
to control media dissemination. Such power is more available to him in a
small country (population approximately 10 million), which is only a few
decades removed from authoritarian rule. The media landscape in the United
State can be characterized as an echo chamber. There are so many outlets
producing messages in so many forums that consumers find it difficult to
make sense of the many messages with which they are assaulted. Rather, as
explained by the theory of selective exposure, audiences tend to seek out
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media that affirm their already-held beliefs, and rarely venture from that
space. To do so causes cognitive dissonance, an inability for the brain to
comfortably negotiate information that it finds to be in conflict with stronglyheld beliefs. While this is certainly not a new concept when it comes to
media consumption, the 24-hour cable news cycle, the rise of Fox News and
MSNBC, and social media use has magnified this. Individuals are flooded
with an array sources and options for media consumption. What appears to
be freedom of choice and access to endless sources has, oddly enough,
turned into a prison of our own creation. Individuals have the illusion of
control in this system, but are forced to pare down these choices, usually
resulting in the creation of media bubbles and silos, echo chambers where
individuals have selectively exposed themselves to like-minded thinking that
not only doesn’t challenge their worldviews, but sometimes represents
“alternative facts” not rooted in reality. To venture out of these silos is to be
inundated and buried under information that doesn’t fit with the user’s view
of reality.
Selective exposure is impossible to avoid given the saturated media
marketplace. It’s true danger lies in the ideological amplification initiated by
selective exposure and the echo chamber, which is capitalized upon by the
paranoid leader. Ideological amplification occurs when an ideological position
(e.g. liberal and conservative) is pushed toward a more extreme position,
despite introducing new information or engaging counterarguments
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(Sunstein 2007). Cass Sunstein (2003) notes three contributing elements:
conformity, group polarization, and social cascades. Although the three feed
off one another, the cascades and group polarization are more relevant to
our discussion of media. This polarization allows for “secrecy” to flourish in
plain sight; either audiences choose not to expose themselves to any
disparate viewpoint or they are able to dismiss news that doesn’t fit their
narrative.
Group polarization occurs “when group members, engaged in
deliberation with one another, end up taking a more extreme position in line
with their predeliberation tendencies” (Sunstein 2003, 11). For example, if a
group of conservative supporters of the 2nd Amendment were to discuss gun
rights, they are more likely to leave that exchange defending more extreme
interpretations of gun rights. Important to note, there is often no new
information contributed, just the power of the echo chamber. This problem is
exacerbated when discussions take place online in self-selected enclaves.
Internet users are able to select the individuals they follow on Twitter, the
friends they have on Facebook, and the news organizations they visit. Since
they are likely to seek out liberal or conservative websites that reaffirm their
ideological beliefs, polarization is increasingly likely and growing ever more
extreme. After years of unregulated cable news and talk radio, and the
precipitous rise of social media, the paranoid leader has a group already
primed to support their extreme positions. The result is an audience that
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both accepts obfuscation, while contributing to it through the creation of
self-limiting ideological positions that frame both the creation and
consumption of public discourse. In an ironic twist, publicity, once thought of
as an important aspect of healthy deliberation and a bulwark against the
worst impulses paranoia, is now a successful part of the paranoid leader’s
strategy, whereas traditional forms of political secrecy, deliberations “behind
closed doors,” may in fact produce healthier, more critical discourse
(Chambers 2004).
Donald Trump has used this abundance of (mis)information as a
means of social control. Not only has his White House policies rewritten what
is considered legitimate “news,” but Trump has also taken this a step further
by deeming certain outlets “fake news,” and maligning the mainstream news
enemy through his Twitter account and endorsing those sites, channels, and
organization that paint him in a favorable light. This tweet, for example,
shows both tactics: “The fake news media is going crazy with their
conspiracy theories and blind hatred. @MSNBC & @CNN are unwatchable.
@foxandfriends is great!” (@realDonaldTrump. February 15, 2017). Trump
has essentially cashed in on a populace already divided not just politically,
but in terms of reality and facts. He has deepened the chasm through
Twitter. The irony that this medium was once seen as being a tool for
democracy and open information (e.g., during the Arab Spring) should not
be lost. At the same time, it also cannot be ignored that in Trump’s tweets,
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speeches, and interviews he adds fuel to the fire, more information to
submerge actual fact beneath the ever-present cacophony of media stories.
While Trump attempts to control the narrative by maligning the press,
Orbán has the ability to control it more directly. One of Orbán’s first acts as
Prime Minister was to change the mediascape to suit his purposes to help
him maintain power and sway the political climate in Hungary. Orbán created
a single, centralized media authority with a government appointed media
official vested with ministerial-level powers such that media messages are
filtered through the government. Media researcher Péter Bajomi-Lazar,
explains,
in a plural landscape, media doesn’t have much of an impact, but in
Hungary, media have been put in the service of a majoritarian
government dedicated to establishing ideological hegemony in an
attempt to change public opinion and voting behavior in the long run in
order to cement its power. (Howden 2016)
Such control is made possible because he majority of Hungarians get their
news from television. As Anita (a pseudonym), another media researcher,
explains, “you can find a lot of views and all sorts of different types of
information online, so in that sense there is pluralism and all sorts of
diversity, but as well all know, most Hungarians get their news from TV, from
broadcasting and that is way more problematic” (personal communication,
2016).
As both Bajomi-Lazar and Anita indicate, the government control of
the media in Hungary is successful because the mediascape is small, limited
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in scope, and relatively homogenous. Thus, Orbán is able to manipulate
media messages to create the illusion of openness, while, in reality, working
in secrecy. There are only three broadcasting services in Hungary. The
national station, MTVA, is essentially the mouthpiece of the government. Of
the other two commercial stations, Anita states, “TV2 is now basically
turning into another governmental channel. RTL is still standing but they’re
under pressure, constant pressure, because the government is using various
means to influence media in Hungary” (personal communication, 2017).
Anita asserts that the mediascape in Hungary is now a state media only
representing the government’s voice.
Control of media, however, is not limited to control of broadcast
television. Print and online journalists also have found themselves under
attack. In an article for the Web site Refugees Deeply, Daniel Howden
provides examples of journalists from origo.hu (a well-known left-leaning
online news source) and the Budapest Business Journal, who felt pressured
to alter their stories or resign (Howden 2016). In both cases, the journalists
resigned, rather than compromise their ethics; they felt remorse for not
doing more to challenge the system from within and leaving a space in which
journalists who aligned themselves with the ruling party could infiltrate the
publications. In 2011, Klubrádió, a news and talk radio station known to be
the voice of left liberal opposition that began broadcasting in 1999, was
denied renewal of their license. This led to a fairly long legal battle which
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Klubrádió eventually won in 2013. As Tamás Bodoky of Átlátszó
(Transparent), a civil watchdog organization asserted, “there are fewer and
fewer workplaces for journalists willing to expose corruption and they mostly
exist on the internet” (Bienvenu 2016).
Perhaps the most notable example of the government’s overreach is
the sudden closure of the country’s long-standing newspaper, Népszabadság.
On September 30, 2015, the paper, one of the premier leftist national
newspapers, was suddenly shut down. The owner cited loss of readership
and loss of revenue, but employees saw the closing as Orbán’s doing.
Journalists showed up to work only to find they were out of a job. Online
readers logged on that morning to find a letter explaining the closure. Even
the archives were removed, although they have since been restored. It is
true that the paper was losing readers. While circulation numbers in the
1990s were in the hundreds of thousands, by 2013 circulation was only 46
thousand, but even with this drop off, the paper boasted the highest
readership amongst the political dailies. As such, the closure of
Népszabadság is seen as being highly symbolic. The word népszabadság
means the people’s liberty. The left-leaning paper was founded during the
1956 Revolution and therefore is associated with the spirit of the people’s
rebellion.
For both Trump and Orbán media is the enemy when it is the voice of
opposition. The paranoid, in order to maintain his position of discursive

Published by SJSU ScholarWorks, 2018

25

Secrecy and Society, Vol. 1, No. 2 [2018], Art. 3

superiority, must frame the oppositional voices in the media as “fake,” “evil,”
or conspiratorial. Given their disparate histories and media ecologies, Trump
and Orbán must deploy different rhetorical strategies in order to achieve the
control over the media they so desire. In the case of either, framing the
oppositional voice as the enemy serves to illuminate a particular read of the
media while simultaneously obscuring what truth the media may indeed
offer. As public focus shifts to attend to the framing of media, other issues,
policies, or ideologies are subsequently obscured. The result is an ability to
be perceived of as a transparent voice of the people when their true
machinations are hidden in plain sight. As such, the ability to engage in
rhetorical sleight of hand becomes increasingly easy.

Sleight of Hand and the Element of Distraction
A glut of information and limited attention spans allow the paranoid
leader to draw attention to one particular issue while deflecting the
importance of others. There are many ways in which paranoid rhetors
distract the public but here we will focus on one: the creation of a real and
present enemy. Through Twitter storms (Trump) or nation-wide referendums
and billboard campaigns (Orbán), the leaders convince their public that 1) an
enemy exists, 2) the enemy presents a real and present threat, and 3) the
enemy is more dangerous than any other potential threat. This enemy is an
ideal scapegoat into which all malice is poured. In his analysis of Adolf
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Hitler’s Mein Kampf, Kenneth Burke calls attention to the rhetorical power of
the scapegoat, especially for a population going through cultural, political, or
economic tumult. The creation of a scapegoat provides “‘curative’ process”
that allows one to transfer the complex, diverse problems of a society into a
sacrificial other, “thereby accomplishing a purification by dissociation” (Burke
1974, 202).
Particularly important for the current rhetorical situation is the ability
to provide a “noneconomic interpretation of economic ills” (Burke 1974,
204), which allows the paranoid a way to circumvent the complexities of the
problems facing society. Thus, it follows that in sacrificing any responsibility
for one’s own problems and in identifying an individual group as the root of
these problems, hatred and self-justification are allowed to grow. As time
passes, this hatred builds until, as Hofstadter (2008, 201) outlines, “the
enemy is thought of as being totally evil and totally unappeasable” and the
only apparent solution is that “he must be totally terminated.” As a result,
these movements take the first steps of a process that can end only one of
two ways: the complete eradication of the scapegoat or the failure of the
movement.
As adherents to the paranoid style, both Trump and Orbán draw
attention to evil forces in their speeches and rhetorical positioning. Trump
relied upon the enemy of the “illegal” immigrant by Mexicans as “rapists”
and “murderers.” These people who purportedly committed the most heinous
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crimes needed to be kept out at any cost, therefore necessitating the
building of a wall that would cost billions of dollars. For Orbán, migrants are
clearly posited as an external threat waiting to attack and the wall is not
theoretical. In 2015, in response to the dramatic increase in asylum seekers
entering coming into the EU, a razor wire fence was erected along Hungary’s
southern border specifically to keep them out. For Trump, democratic
institutions become the “enemy of the people,” which justified blocking press
access and actively supporting the notion that American elections are rigged.
Political opponents became the reason these evils pervaded all corners of
American life and Trump positioned himself as the only person who could
respond to these ubiquitous enemies. The political enemy for Orbán is the
European Union, which he posits as serving the interests of Western Europe
and does not stand for Hungary, as he does.
True to their paranoid style, the goals are unrealistic which can be a
source of frustration for the leader. Trump has doubled-down on his goals
when faced with opposition, tweeting “it is amazing how often I am right,
only to be criticized by the media. Illegal immigration, take the oil, build the
wall, Muslims, NATO!” (@realDonaldTrump, March 15, 2016). Trump
reasserted his credibility and lists off the policy positions that he is correct
about. Orbán makes similar claims. While not wont to make random
statements on Twitter, in his speeches he holds himself up as the defender of
Europe, the only one willing to stand up against the dangerous tide of
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unchecked mass migration. In a 2017 essay written for the National Review,
Orbán (2017) explains,
Hungary may not be counted among the larger EU member states, but
owing to its geographical situation, it has more than once acted as a
conduit of historic change...Responsibility for ensuring controlled
crossing rests with those states on an EU external border, so we had
no choice but to erect a physical barrier.
For the paranoid leader admittance of any type of wrongdoing or
misguidance is not an option. Moreover, his public performance must exude
strength thus allowing him to deflect criticisms as weak or complicit with the
enemy conspirators.
The enemy is a careful creation—faceless enemies who lurk in the
shadows, subversive cabals of particular ideological bent looking to unravel
civil society, or terrorists lurking among the unwashed as they pour,
unchecked, over the border. The enemy of each culture is, in part, an empty
vessel, bound to a term or body of terms filled with culturally bound
understandings. Michael Calvin McGee attempts to make sense of the power
of these abstract terms and the way in which they are utilized to summon
and promote collective commitment as a means of promoting a particular
ideological or normative goal. McGee (1980, 6) defines the ideograph as "a
high-order abstraction, representing collective commitment to a particular
but equivocal and ill-defined normative goal,” a term that evokes a particular
cultural understanding of reality. For a term to summon the ideological power
of the collective at the level of an ideograph, McGee argues that it must
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by-its-nature be abstract, representative of a collective, culture-bound series
of beliefs, function to support an ill-defined normative goal, and in doing so,
function to at times excuse eccentric behaviors or beliefs (McGee 1980, 15).
The enemy is not, by itself, an ideograph. Rather, it is a part of our
understanding of "security" as an ideographic expression. Consider, for
instance, the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001. While the American public might not
have been willing to sacrifice fundamental freedoms for the sake of stopping
terrorism, a notion we see even today with the resistance to a surveillance
state, significant sacrifices were made for the purposes of protecting the
American "security." In his defense of the Act, George W. Bush (2006)
stated:
The law allows our intelligence and law enforcement officials to
continue to share information. It allows them to use tools
against terrorists that they used against—that they use against
drug dealers and other criminals. It will improve our nation’s
security while we safeguard the civil liberties of our people. The
legislation strengthens the Justice Department so it can better
detect and disrupt terrorist threats. And the bill gives law
enforcement new tools to combat threats to our citizens from
international terrorists to local drug dealers.
The focus on Bush’s defense of the Act was not the enemy, but rather the
security that the enemy undermined. In this way, the terrorist and the drug
dealer become the scapegoat sacrificed on the altar of American "security."
In the current context, when we consider the paranoid style utilized in the
Orbán and Trump administrations, "security" rears its ugly head once again,
but the nature of the enemy has changed significantly in both nature and
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scope. This becomes particularly clear when we examine the manner in which
peoples crossing the borders (whether they are called migrants, refugees,
immigrants, aliens, or asylum seekers), are constructed as an enemy that
threatens security.
In his the 2015 speech announcing his presidential run, Trump put a
face on the Mexican immigrant:
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re
not sending you. They’re not sending you. They’re sending people that
have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us.
They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And
some, I assume, are good people. (Washington Post Staff 2015)
In part, Trump’s creation of the immigrant as enemy was dependent on
drawing from an existential economic crisis. The proposed solution to this
crisis was a border wall, funded by the Mexican government between the US
and its southern neighbor. Although the illegal immigrant has long been
viewed as an economic threat, Trump played to a narrative that could be
traced back to the “War on Drugs,” which began in the Nixon administration
and gained additional traction under the presidencies of Richard Nixon and
George H. W. Bush. Despite the fact that the war on drugs is now viewed as
a failure, the narrative tying the immigrant to the trafficking of drugs along
the U.S. southern border continues to persist as can be seen in the third
presidential debate in October 2016; Trump’s perspective on the immigrant
continued to promote the narrative associating the immigrant with drugs and
crime:
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One of my first acts will be to get all of the drug lords, all of the
bad ones—we have some bad, bad people in this country that
have to go out. We’re going to get them out. We’re going to
secure the border. And once the border is secured, at a later
date, we’ll make a determination as to the rest. But we have
some bad hombres here, and we’re going to get them out.
(Zezima 2016)
While the immigrant poses a culturally understood economic and
criminal threat, a second, more powerful manifestation of the paranoid style
presents itself insofar as the immigrant is connected to Islamic terrorism. In
many ways, terrorism represents the perfect enemy for a purveyor of the
paranoid style, in that the terrorist, by its very nature, is a faceless enemy.
Unlike the Communist threat of the Cold War, which was embedded within
the context of a nation state, terrorism is a decentralized threat deeply
embedded in the American cultural psyche since September 11th. As Trump
stresses the immigrant as criminal narrative, he promotes the idea that
suggests the terrorists wait to cross the border like wolves among sheep
which lends itself to the kind of imaginative leap necessary to create and
maintain a paranoid conspiracy. In a 2016 speech delivered in Youngstown,
Ohio, Trump promoted the notion of extreme vetting of visa applicants to the
US. In the speech, he suggested that they presented an existential threat to
the "security" of American citizens, a claim made more plausible by the fears
present within post-9/11 US culture, particularly after terrorist attacks in
Brussels, France, and Germany in the months following his speech. In one
sense, framing the immigrant as enemy is designed to evoke an ideological
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response, drawing the current notions of the enemy to safety and security as
a means of defining the relationship between the culture and the immigrant.
At the same time, the manner in which Trump frames the immigrant as
enemy draws upon the power of spectacle in public secrecy. The identity of
the enemy, shrouded in abstraction, performed controversially, limits the
interpretation of the identity of the enemy behind a wall of public outrage
and discourse. “The secret has become spectacular, renewing the power of
the spectacle as it appropriates the powers of secrecy for itself” (Bratich
2006, 498).
While Trump merely suggested a relationship between the immigrant
and terrorism with his campaign speeches and tweets regarding a potential
“Muslim ban,” he made the connection between the immigrant, terrorism,
"security" and the economy during his acceptance speech for the RNC
nomination: “The American People will come first again. My plan will begin
with safety at home—which means safe neighborhoods, secure borders and
protection from terrorism. There can be no prosperity without law and order”
(Associated Press 2016). Later in the speech, the Republican nominee for
president seamlessly moved between discussions of stopping Islamic
terrorism, vetting of Syrian refugees, and his profound sense of concern
regarding violence at the U.S./Mexico border: “Of all my travels in this
country, nothing has affected me more deeply than the time I have spent
with the mothers and fathers who have lost their children to violence spilling
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across our border” (Associated Press 2016). In making the terrorist and the
immigrant synonymous, Trump evokes not one, but two ideologically fueled
paranoid responses from his audience. First, he draws on the cultural history
of America and terrorism to stoke the fears born out of the post-9/11 world
and the paranoid concerns of the Bush administration. Secondly, Trump links
those very fears to fundamentally change the cultural understanding of the
immigrant—presenting the immigrant, the criminal, and the terrorist as
synonymous and creating the opportunity for drastic measures to address
the problem. After all, what American wouldn’t want to stop an army of
terrorists from pouring over the southern border? In both cases, the power
of linking the terrorist and the immigrants to “the enemy” limits the
responses of the audience within the field of appropriate responses,
obscuring what is possible beneath an ideologically grounded “appropriate”
response.
Orbán has used similar strategies as Trump to frame outsiders as
enemy. For Orbán, the outsiders in question are asylum seekers from Syria,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and northern Africa who began entering the country in
unprecedented numbers in June of 2015. Their goal was to reach Germany,
a country purportedly welcoming to refugees. However, to get to Germany,
they first had to enter Hungary as the border country of the Schengen Area,
the region within which free travel is permitted. Furthermore, according to
the Dublin Regulation, asylum seekers must request asylum in the EU
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country where they first arrive. Thus, Hungary was overwhelmed with asylum
requests. Interestingly enough, while Hungary was not prepared to meet the
needs of the asylum seekers, Orbán was fully prepared to demonize them as
a threat as he began the construction of the migrant as enemy months
before the “crisis” began. Migration was not considered a national concern
until January 2015. Following the Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris, Orbán made
a now famous speech in which he warned the Hungarian people of the
dangers associated with economic migration. At the time of that speech,
Fidesz had experienced a decline in support, but the speech appeared
to resonate with the populace. With that migration became an important
political cause to rally public support. As one political analyst claimed,
“as long as migration is top of the agenda, [Fidesz’s] popularity goes up.
They have to keep up the momentum” (Howden 2016). In the months that
followed, the government launched a national consultation meant to measure
the public response on migrants through push-poll survey questionnaires. In
letters sent with the questionnaires, Orbán writes to Hungarian citizens,
“economic migrants cross our border illegally, and while they present
themselves as asylum-seekers, in fact they are coming to enjoy our welfare
systems and the employment opportunities our country has to offer… This
represents a new type of threat – a threat which we must stop in its tracks”
(Website of the Hungarian Government 2017). With such biased questions as
“Do you agree with the Hungarian government that support should be
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focused more on Hungarian families and the children they can have rather
than on immigration?,” the survey revealed (or constructed) an anti-immigrant
bias. As a result, the government engaged in an anti-immigrant, xenophobic
billboard campaign, which displayed the country’s stance and
sent a message to migrants not to come to Hungary (Timmer 2017).
The billboard campaign preceded the actual influx of refugees. In June
2015, the crisis, as it came to be known, began. From June to September,
thousands of asylum seekers fled across Hungary’s southern border. An
unprecedented number of volunteers mobilized to provide assistance to the
refugees, but the government, already having taking an anti-immigrant
stance, was unmotivated to act in manner that facilitated refugees’
movement through the country. Instead, the government mandated the
construction of a fence which began in July. In September 2015, the fence
was closed at the Hungarian-Serbian border and in October at the
Hungarian-Croatian border. They <who is they? made “irregular border
crossing” illegal and declared Serbia a safe third country so that if an asylum
seeker entered through Serbia, they could be sent back
Before the closing of the border fence, volunteers continued to provide
refugees in the train station with food, clothing, tents, charging stations, and
Wi-Fi access. Meanwhile, the government’s position on the migrants made
the volunteers into criminals. As the spokesperson of the government
explained: “Is it an act of volunteerism or help or is it contributing to the
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self-treating mechanism that’s actually desired by the government, by the
agencies, authorities trying to cope with this? If you give free Wi-Fi at Keleti
train station, everybody is going to go there….it’s against the law” (personal
communication, 2016). To be clear, no volunteer was ever arrested or under
threat of arrest, but the government treated the migrants as criminals, and
thus helping them was ultimately a criminal act.
Humanitarians have faced recent threats by the current administration.
On June 13, 2017, a bill passed Parliament that will require additional
measures for foreign backed NGOs, a move that has been called an
“intimidation of civil society” (Tait 2017). NGO workers, humanitarians, and
volunteers are also seen to be on the wrong side of public opinion. This
public opinion has been carefully crafted through not only the survey and the
billboard campaign, but also government control of the media discussed
previously. Meanwhile, the government has been bolstered. Due to a failure
to act on the part of the EU and a movement toward right-wing populism
throughout the Europe, EU policy on migrants and refugees has started to
look more like Hungary’s – one of exclusion. Hungary supports a policy of
taking care of refugees outside of the borders of the European Union. They
have been vocal supporters of an arrangement with Turkey in which the EU
would provide funding to Turkey to keep refugees there. Orbán sees Brexit
and the election of Donald Trump as evidence that the Hungarian policies are
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to be lauded. In a speech, Trump said that Hungary has gone from being
stigmatized and marginalized to being on the right side of history.
As in the United States, the effort to protect the borders in Hungary
stems from the need to ensure the "security" of the citizenry. Orbán’s
xenophobic campaign began as a reaction to the Charlie Hebdo attacks in
Paris and every subsequent European attack has bolstered Orbán’s claim
that his anti-immigrant stance is the only right and moral one. For example,
in a March 15, 2016 speech, Orbán decried European policies of integration
and tolerance. “Europe is not free,” he asserted,
Because freedom begins with speaking the truth. Today in
Europe it is forbidden to speak the truth…It is forbidden to say
that those arriving are not refugees, but that Europe is
threatened by migration. It is forbidden to say that tens of
millions are ready to set out in our direction. It is forbidden to
say that that immigration brings crime and terror to our
countries. It is forbidden to point out that the masses arriving
from other civilizations endanger our way of life, our culture, our
customs, and our Christian traditions. (Orbán 2016)
Orbán's speech continues in this manner. There have, however, been no
attacks or threats of attacks on Hungary’s soil. Furthermore, the success of
the actions of the government will likely ensure that such attacks do not
happen. The border fence serves as a visible reminder that the people are
both protected and in danger. Because it is a fence that is easily traversable
by cheap wire cutters, constant vigilance is needed in the form of border
patrol guards. Due to recent legislation, patrollers can send anyone they
catch back to the transit zone to legally make their asylum claim, a claim
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that is almost guaranteed to be denied. Doctors without Borders have
reported that those caught by the border guards are beat and forced under
threat of bodily harm to admit their guilt of illegally crossing the border
(Médecins Sans Frontières 2017). The guards, however, are justified in their
actions because they are protecting the safety of the Hungarian people and
even the people of the entire European Union.
As Orbán posits in this speech and many others, migrants threaten
both Hungarian physical safety and economic livelihood. Recent terrorist
attacks throughout Europe can lead to a heightened sense of fear. Evidence
that these attacks have largely been carried out by radicalized second and
third generation immigrants does little to alleviate fears that the terrorists
are steaming in through open borders. Thus events, traumatic as they are,
become tools populist leaders can use to maintain fear. Additionally,
migrants threaten economic security. Many Hungarians report feeling a lack
of economic security since salaries are low compared to other European
countries and Hungarians find it difficult to save. As such, this too is an
easily manipulatable fear. The billboard campaign, mentioned previously,
draws upon both of these inherent fears. For example, one message read, “If
you come to Hungary, you must keep our laws.” A second read, “Do not
come to Hungary to take our jobs.” These messages were ostensibly sent to
the migrants, but they were written in Hungarian – a language one can
assume asylum seekers coming from the Middle East and Northern Africa do
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not speak – so it is clear that the intended audience was the Hungarian
public. Like the fence, these billboards sent the message to Hungarians that
they are under threat but that their government could protect them.
Through Trump’s speeches and tweets and Orbán's speeches,
consultations, and billboards, both leaders carefully crafted a message of
paranoia and fear. In doing so, they have distracted the public’s attention
away from other issues of great political importance. This rhetorical sleight
of hand, through the creation of existential threats, provides another clear
example of open secrecy.
Conclusion
In this article, we looked at the use of the paranoid style of two world
leaders, highlighting how they have used the performance of “openness” to
actually engage in extreme and dangerous forms of public secrecy. Trump
and Orbán have controlled media narratives, constructed internal and
external threats, and engaged in misdirection. At its most extreme, the
American and Hungarian publics are the victims of gaslighting. Attempts on
the part of both of these leaders to lead the public to question their own
understandings of collective memory and history are exemplified through
their public secrecy by which they assert control and maintain the illusion of
truth in deception.
It is important to compare these two leaders; although they come
from two very different nations with very different histories, since coming
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onto the political stage, Trump and Orbán have employed very similar
strategies and messages, representative of the paranoid style imbued with
public secrecy. The two have followed very similar trajectories and in many
cases Orbán, as a benefit of being in office longer, has already achieved what
Trump has set out to do.
The relationship between Trump and Orbán beyond this theoretical
one is unclear. Orbán could be seen in the now infamous video of the world
leaders at NATO in May 2017 when Trump physically pushed the Prime
Minister of Montenegro out of the way in order to move to the front of the
pack. Prior to this moment, Trump was talking to Viktor Orbán. Another
connection can be seen through the appointment of Sebastian Gorka, a
Hungarian-American with clear connections to right-wing groups in Hungary,
who served as the deputy assistant to the president until May 2017, when he
was asked to leave his position. Orbán was the first world leader to endorse
Trump’s candidacy and announced that his inauguration represented the
“end of multilateralism,” and thus asserted that his country (and others)
would now have carte blanche to put their interest above those of their
neighbors and the broader good. In a National Review article, Orbán praised
Trump specifically on three counts: first, his proposal to create the best
secret service in the world; second, his abandonment of the policy of
exporting democracy “as if it were soap or a cell phone, usable in all markets
with no side effects;” and third, Trump’s promise to reinforce borders. Orbán
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(2017) writes, “Trump’s proposals at least acknowledges such threats and
propose solutions to them Europe by contrast has avoided dealing
realistically with threats.”
With the recent emergence of right-wing populism continuing to gain
prominence, Western democracies are enduring yet another wave of growing
pains as they reflect upon and respond to an ever evolving spate of political,
economic, technological, and cultural changes. The impact of these changes
and the responses to them may very well echo for generations to come,
which makes the present moment all the more critical. Not all national or
international threats are formulated through clandestine means; in the cases
of Orbán and Trump, the secrecy and manipulation is happening in plain
sight. History may not be a guide for the future, but it nonetheless provides
a series of cautionary tales and we would be wise to heed them.
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